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I. INTRODUCTION
As part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 Congress enacted
section 736.1 This section specifies the tax treatment of the various
A.B., 1971, St. Anselm's College; J.D., 1974, LL.M., 1978, George Washington Uni-
versity. Professor of Law, University of Baltimore.
1. I.R.C. § 736:
PAYMENTS TO A RETIRING PARTNER OR A DECEASED PART-
NER'S SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST.
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types of payments that a partnership may make to a withdrawing part-
ner.2 It introduced the concept of a liquidation of a partnership inter-
est by the partnership itself, as opposed to the sale3 of that interest to
an outsider or to the continuing partners. In some instances it pro-
vides tax consequences for continuing and withdrawing partners
which are different from those attendant to a sale. It was designed to
make the law concerning disposition of partnership interests simpler4
and to provide flexibility to the parties in fixing the federal tax conse-
quences thereof.5
After over thirty-year's experience with section 736 it is time to
acknowledge that it has not worked very well. The creation of the
concept of a "liquidation" of a partnership interest, with consequences
(a) PAYMENTS CONSIDERED AS DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE OR GUARANTEED
PAYMENT.-Payments made in liquidation of the interest of a retiring
partner or a deceased partner shall, except as provided in subsection (b),
be considered-
(1) as a distributive share to the recipient of partnership income if
the amount thereof is determined with regard to the income of the
partnership, or
(2) as a guaranteed payment described in section 707(c) if the
amount thereof is determined without regard to the income of the
partnership.
(b) PAYMENTS FOR INTEREST IN PARTNERSHIP.-
(1) GENERAL RULE.-Payments made in liquidation of the interest
of a retiring partner or a deceased partner shall, to the extent such
payments (other than payments described in paragraph (2)) are de-
termined, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, to be made
in exchange for the interest of such partner in partnership property,
be considered as a distribution by the partnership and not as a distrib-
utive share or guaranteed payment under subsection (a).
(2) SPECIAL RULES.--For purposes of this subsection, payments in
exchange for an interest in partnership property shall not include
amounts paid for-
(A) unrealized receivables of the partnership (as defined in
section 751(c)), or
(B) good will of the partnership, except to the extent that the
partnership agreement provides for a payment with respect to
good will.
2. "Withdrawal" from a partnership shall be used herein to refer to withdrawal by
retirement, death or expulsion etc. from a partnership. It shall also be used to
describe the sale of a partner's entire partnership interest.
3. Section 741 controls the tax consequences of a sale of a partnership interest for
the selling partner. It provides:
In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, gain
or loss shall be recognized to the transferor partner. Such gain or loss
shall be considered as gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset, except as otherwise provided in section 751 (relating to unrealized
receivables and inventory items which have appreciated substantially in
value).
I.R.C. § 741.
4. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1954).
5. Foxman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 535,550 (1964), cSfd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965).
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that differ from those of a sale, has not simplified the tax law in this
area; it has complicated it unnecessarily. Further, while section 736
has provided flexibility to the parties to withdrawals from partner-
ships, this flexibility has been purchased at the expense of significant
federal taxation policy. This Article examines those two propositions
and advocates abrogating section 736 and the disparity it created be-
tween the tax attributes accompanying liquidations and sales of part-
nership interests. It proposes that all withdrawals from a partnership,
whether accomplished by a sale to outsiders or to the continuing part-
ners on one hand, or by liquidation of the interest by the partnership
on the other, be treated similarly for tax purposes.
II. THE CHOICE WHEN A PARTNER WITHDRAWS:
SALE OR LIQUIDATION
When a partner wishes to withdraw from a partnership that will
continue to exist after his departure6 the Code provides him two alter-
natives: he may sell his interest to an outsider or to some or all of his
partners, or he may receive liquidating distributions from the partner-
ship. If the interest is sold, section 741 provides generally that gain or
loss is treated as capital gain or loss.7 Section 751, referred to in sec-
tion 741, provides that to the extent the sale price represents the value
of the partner's share of unrealized receivables 8 or substantially ap-
preciated inventory,9 that portion of the sale price, to the extent it
6. Under § 708 a partnership will terminate for tax purposes if "within a 12 month
period there is a sale or exchange of 50 percent or more of the total interest in
partnership capital and profits." I.R.C. § 708(b)(1)(B). Termination results in a
constructive distribution of all partnership assets to the partners, the tax conse-
quences of which are controlled by §§ 731 and 732. See Treas. Reg. § 1.708-
1(b)(1)(iv). It is assumed in situations and transactions discussed herein that the
parties do not intend to bring about this constructive distribution in structuring
withdrawal agreements.
7. As in other contexts, the taxpayer may attempt to resist capital asset treatment if
a loss is involved in the transaction. See Stilwell v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 247
(1966).
8. These are defined under I.R.C. § 751(c) as including "to the extent not previously
includable in income under the method of accounting used by the partnership,
any rights (contractual or otherwise) to payment for-
(1) goods delivered, or to be delivered, to the extent the proceeds therefrom
would be treated as amounts received from the sale or exchange of property
other than a capital asset, or
(2) services rendered or to be rendered. Id Under Treas. Reg. § 1.751-
1(c)(4)(i), (ii), potential § 1245 or 1250 depreciation recapture income is treated as
an unrealized receivable.
9. Inventory items are considered to have appreciated substantially in value under
§ 751 if their fair market value exceeds-
"(A) 120 percent of the fair market value of all partnership property, other
than money, and
(B) 10 percent of the fair market value of all partnership property, other than
money .. " I.R.C. § 751(d)(1).
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exceeds the basis of such property to the selling partner, 0 is treated as
ordinary income. The purchaser, whether an erstwhile outsider or an-
other partner, is deemed to have made a capital outlayll and generally
takes a cost basis for the partnership interest.12 In accordance with
treatment of capital outlays generally, the purchaser receives no cur-
rent deduction for the price of a partnership interest, regardless of
how the selling partner must characterize the transaction.'3
The tax treatment of the sale of a partnership interest under the
1954 Code is similar to that developed by the courts before 1954. Sec-
tion 741 embodies an assumption that a partnership interest repre-
sents an asset apart from the underlying assets of the partnership, and
further, that this interest is a capital asset. This characterization rep-
resents a triumph of the entity theory of partnership, a view that the
partnership represents for tax purposes something more than the ag-
gregate of its assets.14 The entity view was adopted by the courts quite
consistentlyL5 in the face of long-standing opposition by the Bureau of
Revenue, which contended that the determination of ordinary income
versus capital gain should be made on an asset-by-asset basis.16 For
tax purposes, the sale of a sole proprietorship is treated as a sale of its
aggregate assets.17 Similarly, the asset-by-asset approach views the
partnership as an aggregate of sole proprietors. Under the 1939 Code
10. The basis to the selling partner is the same as it would be under § 732 if such
property had been distributed to him in a current (i.e., non-liquidating) distribu-
tion immediately before the sale. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a)(2). Under § 732 the
basis of property to a distributee partner generally is the basis of the property to
the partnership immediately before the distribution, unless that basis exceeds the
basis of the distributee's partnership interest. In that case, the basis of the dis-
tributed property becomes the basis of the distributee's partnership interest re-
duced by any money distributed in the same transaction.
11. Cooney v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 101, 108 (1975). This was also true under the
1939 Code. See Pope v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 420 (1st Cir. 1930).
12. See I.R.C. § 742, which provides that the basis of a partnership interest is deter-
mined under §§ 1011 and following.
13. I.R.C. § 263. The House version of the 1954 Code provided for an exclusion from
income for the purchasing partner for amounts a selling partner would be re-
quired to include in income under § 751. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 4, at
71. The Senate did not agree with this portion of the legislation and it was not
included in the Code. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1954).
14. See Anderson & Coffee, Proposed Revision of Partner and Partnership Taxation:
Analysis of the Report of the Advisory Group on Subchapter K, 15 TAx L. REv.
497 (1960).
15. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Smith, 173 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 818
(1949); Shapiro v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 375 (D. Minn.), qffd, 178 F.2d 459
(8th Cir. 1949); Humphrey v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 280 (1935). But see Kessler
v. United States, 124 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1941); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
United States, 47 F. Supp. 98 (Ct. Cl. 1942).
16. This position was taken in G.C.M. 10092, 11-1 C.B. 114 (1932) and was not revoked
until G.C.M. 26379, 1950-1 C.B. 58 (1950) in recognition of the position generally
taken by the courts.
17. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945).
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and before, if the courts determined that payments by the partnership
to a withdrawing partner represented the value of the partner's inter-
est in partnership receivables, the transaction was not treated as a sale
and the withdrawing partner was deemed to have received ordinary
income. In determining whether payments received by a withdrawing
partner represented his share of receivables, the courts generally ex-
amined whether that partner's partnership interest included property
other than receivables. If the partner's interest consisted exclusively
of receivables, payments from the partnership were treated as ordi-
nary income to the withdrawing partner or his estate.1 8 Thus, before
the 1954 Code, tax treatment of the consideration received by a with-
drawing partner depended upon whether the transaction was deter-
mined to be a sale of a partnership interest, and that depended upon
what was being sold.
The judicial framework for analyzing the disposition of a partner-
ship interest developed without specific statutory guidance. The adop-
tion of sections 741 and 736 in the 1954 Code provided that guidance
but also made the picture more complex. Section 736 introduced a
provision for the "liquidation"19 of a partnership interest with poten-
tial consequences quite distinct from those resulting from a sale. Sec-
tion 736 provides that payments in liquidation of a partnership interest
are to be treated by the recipient either as a distributive share or guar-
anteed payment of partnership income, 20 or as a distribution for an
interest in partnership property.2 ' Payments treated as a distributive
share or guaranteed payments of partnership income are includable in
18. This may be seen in Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935), in which the estate
of a deceased member of a partnership, engaged in business as ship brokers, re-
ceived for one year, pursuant to the partnership agreement, payments from the
partnership as if the deceased had remained living. No capital had ever been
invested in the partnership by any of the partners. The Court, in treating these
payments as ordinary income, held:
Where the effect of the contract is that the deceased partner's estate
shall leave his interest in the business and the surviving partners shall
acquire it by payments to the estate, the transaction is a sale .... It
results that the surviving partners are taxable upon firm profits and the
estate is not. Here, however, the survivors have purchased nothing be-
longing to the decedent, who made no investment in the business and
owned no tangible property connected with it. The portion of the profits
paid his estate was, therefore, income and not corpus ....
1d at 254 (footnote omitted). See also Black v. Lockhart, 209 F.2d 308 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 819 (1954); Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1937);
Beavers v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 336 (1958); Spicker v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 91
(1956); McAfee v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 720 (1947); Doyle v. Commissioner, 37
B.T.A. 323 (1938), aqjd, 102 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1939).
19. A liquidation of a partnership interest is actually defined in § 761(d), as "the ter-
mination of a partner's entire interest in a partnership by means of a distribution,
or a series of distributions, to the partner by the partnership." I.R.C. § 761(b).
20. I.R.C. § 736(a).
21. I.R.C. § 736(b).
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the gross income of the recipient.22 If the withdrawing partner must
treat payments from the partnership as a distributive share or as guar-
anteed payments under section 736(a), the partnership income is
reduced.2 3
If the payments received from the partnership are treated as distri-
butions for an interest in partnership property, the tax treatment ac-
corded the withdrawing and continuing partners is closer to that
incident to a sale. Payments that represent the withdrawing partner's
interest in partnership property other than unrealized receivables 24 or
partnership goodwill, and which are not specifically identified in the
agreement pertaining to withdrawals as payments for goodwill,25 are
treated as partnership distributions generally. To the extent these
payments exceed the basis of the withdrawing partner's interest, they
constitute taxable gain.2 6 Generally this gain is capital gain.27 If dis-
tributions of money or property other than substantially appreciated
inventory are made with respect to the departing partner's share of
substantially appreciated inventory,28 a portion of the distribution is
allocated to the value of that inventory. To the extent that the
amount of the distribution so allocated exceeds the adjusted basis of
the substantially appreciated inventory to the withdrawing partner,2 9
the resulting gain is ordinary income.3 0 Section 736 provides no de-
22. A partner, under LR.C. § 702(a)(1)-(8), reports his distributive share of various
items of partnership income in determining his income tax. Under I.R.C. § 707(c)
a partner who receives a payment that must be made regardless of the income (or
loss) of the partnership includes that payment in his income as ordinary income.
Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(c).
23. Guaranteed payments under § 707(c) are deductible by the partnership. Treas.
Reg. § 1.707-1(c). The requirement that a withdrawing partner take his distribu-
tive share of partnership income into his individual income reduces the amount of
partnership income which must be reported by the continuing partners.
24. Under § 736(b) (2) (A), payments attributable to unrealized receivables are treated
as payments under § 736(a).
25. I.R.C. § 736(b)(2)(B).
26. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1).
27. I.R.C. §§ 731(a)(2), 741.
28. I.R.C. § 751(d)(1).
29. See I.R.C. §§ 751(b), 732.
30. Section 736 does not refer to substantially appreciated inventory. Treatment of
these payments under § 736(b) as distributions invokes § 731, which itself re-
quires that distributions pertaining to substantially appreciated inventory be
treated under § 751(b). See aZso Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(b)(6). Under § 751(b), to
the extent that a partner is treated as having received money (or any other prop-
erty) for his share of substantially appreciated inventory, he is deemed to have
sold that inventory to the partnership. The gain on the exchange is treated as
ordinary income. A partnership may also realize ordinary income if it exchanges
substantially appreciated inventory or unrealized receivables for a partner's
share of partnership property other than money, Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(b)(2)(i).
But since § 736 appears to contemplate payments of money by the partnership,
gain to the partnership would not occur in a transaction under § 736.
1986]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
duction to the continuing partners or the partnership for section
736(b) payments for partnership property. To the extent that the
withdrawing partner realizes gain on the distributions, the continuing
partners may adjust the basis of remaining partnerships upward under
section 734,31 if the partnership has a section 754 election in effect.
If the section 754 election is not in effect, the remaining partners
get the worst of both worlds with respect to the section 736(b) pay-
ments; they are not deductible and there is no step-up in the basis of
the partnership property to reflect the capital outlay in buying the
departing partner's interest. To the extent that payments are deemed
to fall under section 736, the regulations grant the departing partner
an unusual degree of flexibility in reporting his capital gain.3 2
Under section 736 the partnership, acting as an entity, is able to
obtain tax consequences which the partners as individuals could not.
The partnership is permitted a section 736(a) deduction for payments
for the value of the withdrawing partner's interest in receivables, or
even in some instances for the value of the departing partner's interest
in goodwill. Thus, the partnership as an entity is accorded more sig-
nificance with respect to the disposition of partnership interests than
under prior law. While prior law emphasized what was sold in deter-
mining tax consequences, section 736 sometimes permits the identity
of the buyer, if it is the partnership, to be determinative in some cases.
While section 736 has created more options with respect to the disposi-
tion of partnership interests, it has also created more confusion.
III. THE CHECKERED HISTORY OF SECTIONS 736 AND 741
A. Development of Objective Tests
In codifying a scheme which ostensibly gives partners a choice be-
31. See I.R.C. § 734(b)(1)(A). If § 751(b) is involved, the partnership may adjust the
basis of substantially appreciated inventory it is deemed to have purchased to the
amount of money exchanged for it. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g) example 2(e).
32. If both § 736(a) and (b) payments are made to a withdrawing partner, the parties
are allowed to determine, in an arm's length agreement, the valuation of the part-
ner's interest in partnership property. This valuation, the amount of the § 736(b)
payments, will generally be regarded as correct. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(b)(1). If
the payments to a withdrawing partner are fixed in amount, the portion of the
payments each year that bears the same ratio to total payments in the year as
§ 736(b) payments bear to total payments for the life of the agreement is applied
against the basis of the withdrawing partner's partnership interest. This is simi-
lar to the installment method of reporting under § 453. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-
1(b)(5)(i). If there is no fixed amount of payments, the payments are treated first
as § 736(b) payments up to the value of the withdrawing partner's interest in
partnership property. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(b)(5)(ii). The parties may also agree
upon any other method of allocating payments between § 736(a) and (b) as long
as the total amount allocated to § 736(b) payments does not exceed the fair mar-
ket value of the withdrawing partner's interest in partnership property. Treas.
Reg. § 1.736-1(b)(5)(iii).
[Vol. 65:450
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tween the tax consequences of a sale and a liquidation, Congress in-
tended to make the law simpler and its application more predictable.33
As noted earlier, Congress also intended to provide flexibility to con-
tinuing and withdrawing partners in structuring the tax consequences
of withdrawal from a partnership. In retrospect it seems odd that
Congress would have attempted to secure these objectives through
section 736, a section that has proved to be too complex to be adminis-
tered predictably.34
It does not matter whether the fault for this complexity lies with
Congress, as has been suggested by the Tax Court,35 or with taxpayers
who do not know what they are doing,3 6 or with taxpayers who do
know what they are doing37 or with the courts. The fact is, complexity
frustrates the desirable flexibility that would exist if knowledgeable
parties were able to sit down under the tension of adverse interests
and weigh predictable alternatives. Instead, the regime of sections 736
and 741 is one which exalts "pencil pushing,"38 or an ability to over-
reach the other party to the agreement. For sections 736 and 741 to
work as Congress intended, the parties to withdrawal agreements
must clearly state what they intend the tax consequences to be. Very
frequently parties to these agreements do not do so. Even when they
33. The House Ways and Means Committee commented: The published regulations,
rulings, and court decisions are incomplete and frequently contradictory. As a
result partners today cannot form, operate or dissolve a partnership without any
assurances as to tax consequences. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 4, at 65.
34. In W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WmTmIE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS
AND PARTNERS 22.01[4] (abridged ed. 1978) the authors blame the complexity of
§ 736 on its references to other complex Code sections such as 707, 731 and 751.
35. Foxman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 535, 551 n.9 (1964), affd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir.
1965).
36. In Jacobs v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 848, 855 (1974), the court noted, un-
derstandingly but perhaps patronizingly, that the taxpayers who negotiated what
turned out to be an ambiguous agreement were "medical men." A distressing
number of ambiguous agreements have involved lawyers, see Cooney v. Commis-
sioner, 65 T.C. 101, 108 (1975), and CPAs, see Spector v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d
376 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 868 (1981), on remand, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 631
(1982); Karan v. Commissioner, 319 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1963); Champlin v. Commis-
sioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 802 (1977); Coven v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 295 (1976);
Kelly v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1090 (1970); Wheeling v. Commissioner,
23 T.C.M. (CCH) 778 (1964).
37. See Kelly v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1090 (1970). In upbraiding the par-
ties to a withdrawal agreement for an apparently contrived ambiguity, the court
commented:
It is indeed unfortunate where, as here, taxpayers having expertise in
the field of Federal taxation abuse the freedom which Congress permits
them in determining the tax consequences of business transactions by
obscuring such transactions in confusion and ambiguity.
Id at 1105.
38. Horvitz, Life Insurance as a Planning TooL Use of Insurance to Fund Partner-
ship Buy-Sell Agreement, 33d N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx'N 867, 870 (1975). The
author did not appear to have used that term disparagingly.
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do, however, their intent is subject to unpredictable second-guessing
by the courts. The critical difficulty with the regime of sections 736
and 741 is differentiating a liquidation by the partnership from a sale
of a partnership interest to all or some of the remaining partners.
There is no problem if the purchasing party is an outsider;39 that
transaction is generally capital because of what is being sold, a part-
nership interest. When other partners are acquiring the partnership
interest of the withdrawing partner, however, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether they are acting for the partnership or as individuals.
Although in either case it is a partnership interest which is being sold,
the difference in taxes can be quite significant. The parties may usu-
ally be expected to assume postures that suit the needs of litigation
regardless of what was hammered out earlier in negotiations. 40 It can
sometimes be extremely difficult to determine whether the continu-
ing partners, in paying the withdrawing partner for his interest, are
acting for the partnership or as individuals. According such a high
degree of significance to the capacity in which the actors are deemed
to be acting is particularly remarkable in light of holdings that a part-
nership making a section 736 acquisition may use individual funds of
the partners,41 and partners acquiring as individuals may use partner-
ship funds.42
The courts have struggled to characterize withdrawal payments as
representing a sale or liquidation in accordance with (but sometimes
in spite of) the objective circumstances of the withdrawal. A number
of objecfive tests have appeared in the cases. The tests as outlined
nearly twenty years ago in a perceptive article by Professor Swihart43
are as follows: 1) the economic consequences test; 2) the basis of pay-
ments test; 3) the maker of the payments test; 4) the source of the
payments test; 5) the obligation of payments test; and 6) the intention
of the parties test.44
39. Swihart, Tax Problems Raised by Liquidations of Partnership Interests, 44 TEx.
L. REV. 1209, 1225 (1966).
40. W. McKEE, supra note 34, at I 15.02(a) states:
The aftermath of incomplete documentation of a withdrawal transac-
tion generally begins to unfold when the withdrawing partner reports
payments attributable to his interest in good will as capital gain from the
sale of his interest under § 741, and the continuing partners report good
will payments as § 736(a) payments.
Unfortunately, this inconsistent reporting occurs even when the intended con-
sequences appear quite clear. See Spector v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 376 (5th
Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 868 (1981) and Boland v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1145 (1972), affd, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974).
41. Sloan v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1606 (1981).
42. Foxman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 535 (1964), affld, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965).
43. Swihart, supra note 39.
44. Id at 1225-26. A similar list of tests, excluding the source and basis of payments
tests, is set out in Note, Tax Consequences of Withdrawal from a Two Man Part-
nership: Sale or Liquidation?, 54 CoRNELL L. REv. 438, 443 (1969).
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Professor Swihart's analysis was undoubtedly insightful since all of
his tests, particularly the latter four, have been employed by the
courts in distinguishing sales from liquidations. The decisions indicate
that they have not been applied with much consistency. The degree of
inconsistency strongly indicates that the statutory attempt to treat a
liquidation of a partnership as distinct from the sale of a partnership
should not be continued.
An additional test that may be decisive in distinguishing a sale
from a liquidation is whether the departing "partner" ever became a
partner in the partnership that made the acquisition of his partnership
interest. Assuming that a sensible construction of the regulations
under section 736 requires that the payments be made by the entity of
which the withdrawing partner was a member, former membership by
the payee in the paying entity would seemingly be a sine qua non of
liquidation treatment.45 Membership status, however, has not always
been required. This last factor will be discussed in connection with
the last of Prof. Swihart's tests, the intention of the parties.
B. Application of the Objective Tests by the Courts
1. The Economic Consequences Test
Under the economic consequences test, a sale by a withdrawing
partner to other partners on a pro rata basis is treated as a liquida-
tion.46 Although it has not gained acceptance in the cases, this test
would eliminate problems such as the need to pick through the en-
trails of withdrawal agreements, or to scrutinize the source of with-
45. I.R.C. § 761(d) defines a liquidation as termination of a partnership interest by a
distribution or distributions "to the partner by the partnership" (emphasis ad-
ded). The regulations under §§ 761 and 736 do not specify whether the partner-
ship making the payments must be the same one to which the withdrawing
partner belonged.
The regulations under § 736 appear implicitly to require that the partnership
entities be the same by treating the continuing "partner" in a two person partner-
ship from which the other partner has withdrawn as a partner for purposes of
§ 736. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(6).
A House Ways and Means Committee proposal, H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1960) which would have continued § 736(a) treatment for payments by a succes-
sor entity even though a partnership goes out of existence or takes another form
would also indicate that, under § 736 as enacted in 1954, a partner must have been
a member of the same partnership making the payments for § 736 to apply. The
proposal was not enacted although it was passed by the House of Representatives.
See H.R. REP. No. 1231, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1960) and S. REP. No. 1616, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 87-88 (1960).
Leading commentators appear to disagree among themselves. See W. MCKEE,
supra note 34, at 22.03[3] (payments made by a corporation or a new partnership
are not deductible). But see 2 A. WILLIs, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, PART-
NERSHIP TAXATION § 144.05 (3d ed. 1984) (trend in private rulings is to allow de-
duction by a successor entity).
46. Swihart, supra note 39, at 1225.
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drawal payments. It would also eliminate the need to identify the
capacity in which the payors had made withdrawal payments. For a
withdrawal (not a sale) of one partner from a two person partnership,
the economic consequences test would require that the payments be
treated as liqvidation payments under section 736.47 In 1960 the House
of Representatives adopted a provision similar to the economic conse-
quences test.48
Although the test is undoubtedly useful, courts have demonstrated
an unwillingness to adopt it. In those cases involving the withdrawal
of one partner from a two person partnership, the decisions appear to
be split evenly.49 Unfortunately for the government, one split in au-
thority occurred in two decisions arising out of the same factual situa-
tion. In Phillips v. Commissioner,50 the Tax Court held that a partner
who withdrew from a two person partnership had made a sale of his
partnership interest and was, therefore, entitled to capital gain treat-
ment. However, the Court of Claims in Miller v. United States 51 held
that the continuing partner in the same partnership was able to de-
duct the payments on the basis that they were in liquidation of the
withdrawing partner's interest under section 736. The government
was whipsawed!
As reported by the Tax Court in Phillips, Phillips and Miller
formed a two person partnership which represented manufacturers of
sporting goods. Miller decided he wanted to terminate the partner-
ship after Phillips had a heart attack. Miller was persuaded by the
partnership's principal client to pay Phillips a percentage of the com-
missions from that client for three years.
In response to the contention by the IRS that the payments were
income to Phillips under section 736(a)(1), the court noted:
The Commissioner concedes . . . that this section applies only to payments
made by the partnership and not to transactions between the partners. That
would seem to end the matter since here the agreement was between the part-
ners, the amounts to be paid Charles were not to be paid by the partnership
but were to come only from future earnings of Miller, and were to be paid by
him. The partnership earned nothing after March 31, 1958, and ceased to
47. As noted, Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(6) permits the continuing partner to deduct
payments to the withdrawing partner under § 736 despite the anomaly of accord-
ing partnership status to the remaining sole proprietor. This regulation is effec-
tive only if it is determined that liquidation rather than sale treatment is
appropriate.
48. H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). S. REP. No. 1616, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 76
(1960) stated that the provision would "provide uniformity of treatment for these
payments regardless of the form in which they are made."
49. See Boland v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1145 (1972), affd, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d
Cir. 1974); Phillips v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 157 (1963) (similar transactions
found to be sales). Compare Miller v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 331 (1967);
Stilwell v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 247 (1966) (liquidations found).
50. 40 T.C. 157 (1963).
51. 181 Ct. Cl. 331 (1967).
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exist.5 2
If there could be no partnership when one partner left, there could be
no liquidation under section 736.53
The Court of Claims, in allowing Miller to deduct the payments to
Phillips, noted that the Tax Court had not referred to that portion of
the regulations which sanctioned the liquidation of a two person part-
nership.5 4 Further, the court noted that the agreement providing for
the withdrawal did not use any language describing the transaction as
a sale.55 The court cited Stilwell v. Commissioner5 6 for the proposi-
tion that unless the language of the agreement supports a finding that
a sale was intended, no sale will be found. Obviously this proposition
was not considered controlling by the Tax Court in its finding that the
same agreement provided for a sale. Neither court, however, found
the presence of a pro rata acquisition to be determinative.
The economic consequences test might indeed resolve many dis-
putes as to whether partnership withdrawals constitute sales or liqui-
dations. Unfortunately, its acceptance cannot be compelled in the
course of the development of the common law in this area.
2. The Basis of Payment Test
If the basis of the payment for the partnership interest is a percent-
age of the partnership income, this test treats the transaction as a liq-
uidation.57 As with the economic consequences test, adoption of this
test as a litmus indicator of liquidation treatment would probably
eliminate some controversies. The assumption of liquidation treat-
ment would not completely resolve the tax treatment of the payments
since it would still be necessary to determine whether these payments
fall under section 736(a) or (b).
Unfortunately, this test has not received complete acceptance
either. In Phillips v. Commissioner58 and Wheeling v. Commis-
sioner,5 9 in which payments to the retiring partners were calculated as
52. Phillips v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 157, 161 (1963).
53. The court's holding represented an implicit rejection of regulations that accom-
modate the liquidations of a two person partnership. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(6).
Perhaps the court held as it did because the IRS raised the § 736 issue in an
amended answer and thus had the procedural incubus usually shouldered by the
taxpayer, the burden of proof. The court held that the IRS had not alleged any
facts to support its contention that a liquidation rather than a sale had taken
place. I& at 160.
54. Miller v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 331, 343 (1967).
55. Id at 344.
56. 46 T.C. 247 (1966).
57. See Swihart, supra note 39, at 1225.
58. 40 T.C. 157 (1963).
59. 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 778 (1964). See also Kelly v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH)
1090 (1970).
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a percentage of partnership income, the Tax Court ruled that the
transactions resulted in a sale and not a liquidation. Again, the devel-
opment of the common law is not always in the direction of tidiness
and simplicity.
3. Maker of the Payments Test
Under this test, if payments to a withdrawing partner are made
directly by the partnership, the transaction is treated as a liquidation,
but if made by the remaining partners, the transaction is treated as a
sale.60 This test is very formalistic and, if it were the only test consist-
ently applied and if the source of the payments could always be deter-
mined with precision, it too would avoid many controversies.
Ostensibly this test is consistent with the regulations under section
736, which provide that liquidation treatment applies only to pay-
ments by a partnership, 61 and the regulations under section 741, which
provide that the section applies to transactions involving "one or more
members of the partnership" or "one or more persons who are not
members of the partnership."62 In the absence of such a limited con-
struction of the regulations, there are four possible combinations of
findings on the issue of whether there is a sale or liquidation based on
the maker of the payments. They may be viewed schematically as
follows:
Payments Made By: Payments Found to Constitute:
Partnership Sale Liquidation
Partners as individuals Sale Liquidation
If the regulations under sections 736 and 741 are applied scrupu-
lously, a court should not be permitted to find a sale when payments
are made by the partnership or a liquidation when payments are made
by partners as individuals. In fact, because at times other factors
predominate, the courts have made findings involving all four of the
above combinations.
In at least four instances the Tax Court has found a sale when the
payments, at least formally, were made by the partnership.63 Foxman
v. Commissioner,64 undoubtedly the most frequently cited decision in
this area, perhaps best demonstrates why the identity of the maker of
the payments should not always be determinative. In that case one
60. Swihart, supra note 39, at 1225.
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(1).
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.741-1(b).
63. Coven v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 295 (1976); Kelly v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1090 (1970); Foxman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 535 (1964), affd, 352 F.2d
466 (3d Cir. 1965) and Wheeling v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 778 (1964).
64. 41 T.C. 535 (1964), affd, 352 F.2d 466 (3rd Cir. 1965).
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partner had a falling out with the other two. The partners who were
to continue were not able to get a bank loan for the amount sought by
the withdrawing partner. Thus, the remaining partners agreed to pay
the withdrawing partner in installments, presumably in large part
from the earnings of the partnership. Although the court found that
the parties had discussed only a sale, the partnership was added as a
party to the agreement at the suggestion of counsel for the continuing
partners.6 5 The intent of that maneuver is plain. It gave the continu-
ing partners a basis for contending that payments to the withdrawing
partner were deductible liquidation payments. The indebtedness to
the withdrawing partner was paid by checks with the partnership as
drawer. Not surprisingly, the parties reported the payments inconsis-
tently; the continuing partners deducted the payments and the with-
drawing partner reported them as capital gain.66
It is quite clear from the expressed intention of the parties and
from the language of the agreement and the presence of consideration
other than partnership funds,67 that the court's finding of a sale was
correct. Nevertheless, in one sense the continuing partners should
have been able to rely on the regulations under section 741 which pro-
vide that only when the acquisition is made by the partners, and not
the partnership, may the withdrawing partner receive sale treatment.
Since the continuing partners succeeded in making the partnership a
party to the withdrawal agreement by securing the withdrawing part-
ner's signature to that agreement, and since the partnership made the
payments from partnership funds, their claim to liquidation treatment
had some legitimacy.
The decision of the Tax Court in Kelly v. Commissioner68 is para-
doxical as to the effect of the identity of the payor. Kelly involved
payments by a partnership to two different parties under different
circumstances.
Payments made to one McCartan were made by the partnership
and were based on a percentage of fees billed to certain clients over
eight years. Although the payments were made by the partnership,
the court held that McCartan had never been a partner in the partner-
ship making the payments and that the payments were a means for
him to sell his accounting practice to the partnership.69 Thus, since
McCartan had never been a member of the partnership, payments to
him could not constitute liquidation of a partnership interest. The
65. Id at 540.
66. Id at 548.
67. The withdrawing partner received stock in a corporation owned by the continu-
ing partners which was not partnership property. Id at 552.
68. 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1090 (1970).
69. Id. at 1104.
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identity of the payor thus was irrelevant. The payments were not de-
ductible by the continuing partners.
The partnership also made payments to one Chamberlain when he
withdrew from the partnership. One of the bases for the court's find-
ing of a liquidation was that Chamberlain was paid by a check drawn
on the partnership.0 Thus, within the same decision, the identity of
the payor was accorded different treatment.71 Only the finding that
the payments by the partnership to Chamberlain constituted a liquida-
tion was consistent with the regulations under section 741.72
When payments to a withdrawing partner are found to have been
made by the continuing partners, liquidation treatment should not be
applicable. Indeed, some decisions have based the finding of a sale in
part upon a finding that payments were made by a partner or
partners.7 3
A very perplexing case, Sloan v. Commissioner,74 demonstrates
that a court may find a liquidation even though the withdrawal pay-
ments were made by the partners. In Sloan one member of a three
person medical partnership withdrew. The withdrawal agreement
provided in part that the remaining partners:
will pay or cause to be paid to [the departing partner] the sum of $2,000 per
month as retirement pay for a period of eighteen (18) months .... It is fur-
ther agreed that the obligation for said payment shall be One Thousand
($1,000) Dollars per month for [each partner] . .. and that neither ... shall
be obligated to pay [the withdrawing partner] the other's proportionate part
thereof.7 5
The IRS denied the continuing partners a deduction for the payments.
The obvious creation of individual liability for the payments76 and the
70. Id at 1105. Oddly enough, the court cited Foxman as authority for that
proposition.
71. In Coven v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 295 (1976), payments to a withdrawing partner
were made first by one of his partners and then by another partnership into
which the withdrawing partner's partnership later merged. The payments were
held to constitute a sale. Obviously, treating the identity of the maker of the
payment as decisive might have required recharacterization of the payments in
midstream.
72. See also Cooney v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 101 (1975).
73. See, e.g., Karan v. Commissioner, 319 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1963), and a case arising
out of the same factual situation, Estate of Melnik v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M.
(CCH) 74 (1961), aSffd, 319 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1963). See also Coven v. Commis-
sioner, 66 T.C. 295 (1976). In Coven, the individual partner who made payments
deducted them before they were assumed by a successor partnership. Although
the court noted that such a deduction was not correct, it regarded the deduction
as a revelation of the payor's belief as to the individual nature of the contract.
Id at 306 n.9.
74. 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1606 (1981).
75. Id. at 1608 (emphasis added).
76. Further, the new partnership of the continuing partners did not assume the obli-
gations of the former partnership. Id. at 1609.
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designation of the payments created an ambiguity.77
In the face of this ambiguity the court applied three tests to the
facts: the language of the agreement, the placement of the obligation
for the payments, and the intent of the parties.78 The court found con-
flicting signals in its review of the three factors. The agreement did
not employ the terminology that would normally accompany a sale.
The disclaimer of joint liability for the payments favored the conten-
tion by the IRS that the payments constituted a sale. Turning to the
intent of the parties, the court noted that all parties had treated the
payments consistently; the continuing partners had deducted them
and the withdrawing partner had reported them as ordinary income.
Emphasizing this consistent treatment for tax purposes, the court
concluded that "the manifest intent of the parties" was to liquidate the
interest of the withdrawing partner.7 9 That finding is probably accu-
rate but it allowed the parties to do what the regulations under section
736 do not appear to permit- to treat payments bypartners as liquida-
tion payments. No one may have been harmed by what the court did
in that particular case, but the decision makes tax planning more un-
predictable and difficult.80
It is clear that while the regulations place considerable stress on
the identity of the maker of the payments to a withdrawing partner, it
has not always been a significant factor in court decisions.
4. Source of Payments Test
Under this test a liquidation results if payments to a withdrawing
partner are made from partnership income or assets.8 1 This approach
gives a very formalistic emphasis to the entity view as the income or
funds of the partnership are usually the products of the exertions or
investments of the partners. Taken to its logical extreme, this test
would allow the continuing partners to recharacterize sale payments
unilaterally by using partnership funds to discharge their individual
liabilities.
77. Lamenting this ambiguity the court commented: "The volume of litigation still
occurring in this area is, we think, more a testimony to the inadequacy of parties'
tax planning than any obscurity in the law." Id. at 1610.
78. The court began its analysis with the almost whimsical quotation from Foxman v.
Commissioner, 41 T.C. 553, 550 (1964): "How do we choose between Tweedledum
and Tweedledee?" This reflects the view in both cases that the only significant
issue in these cases is how, among themselves, the parties have arranged the tax
consequences.
79. Sloan v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1606, 1612 (1981).
80. A commentator has indicated that Sloan creates a new tension between the word-
ing of an agreement and the intent of the parties as evidenced by other circum-
stances. Moore, The Sloan Doctrine - New Twist in the Partnership Interest
Sale/Redemption Question?, 14 TAx ADVISER 613, 615 (1983).
81. Swihart, supra note 39, at 1225-26.
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This test was rejected by the court in Foxman.8 2 As discussed ear-
lier,8 3 the continuing partners made the partnership a party to their
agreement to purchase the withdrawing partner's interest. The part-
nership gave promissory notes for the deferred purchase price. The
continuing partners argued that this demonstrated that the payments
constituted a liquidation. The court rejected this position comment-
ing: "The fact that they utilized partnership resources to discharge
their own individual liability in such manner can hardly convert into a
section 736 'liquidation' what would otherwise qualify as a section 741
'sale.' "84
This test does not appear to have played any role in cases in which
it has been necessary to distinguish between a sale and a liquidation.
5. Obligation of Payments Test
Under the obligation of payments test, if the primary obligation to
make withdrawal payments is placed upon the continuing partners in-
dividually, a sale results. If it is placed upon the partnership, a liquida-
tion occurs.8 5 This test obviously involves considerations of greater
substance than the maker of payments or the source of payments
tests. It has not been applied as a litmus test either. While the results
under this test probably do not vary as widely as those under the
maker of payments test, they do not provide much reliable guidance to
drafters of agreements. This is not only because of the lack of com-
plete consistency in the results, but also because of some of the intri-
cacy of the reasoning employed in court decisions.
The test appeared to have been dispositive in Champlin v. Commis-
sioner.8 6 In Champlin the taxpayer received monthly installments
following his withdrawal from an accounting partnership, which he
contended resulted from the sale of his partnership interest. The IRS
contended that the monthly installments were liquidation payments.
The court noted that the withdrawal agreement was between the tax-
payer and "the continuing partnership"8 7 and that the three continu-
ing partners signed the agreement in their representative rather than
their individual capacities. Noting that the continuing partners did
not obligate themselves personally to pay the taxpayer,8 8 the court
found that the payments constituted a liquidation and were income to
the taxpayer.
82. Foxman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 535 (1964), qffd, 352 F.2d 466 (3rd Cir. 1965).
83. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
84. Foxman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 535, 553 (1964), affd, 352 F.2d 466 (3rd Cir.
1965).
85. Swihart, supra note 39, at 1226.
86. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 802 (1977).
87. I& at 808.
88. Id.
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The result is consistent with the factual findings and the obligation
to make payments test, but one must question the significance of a
distinction based upon whether partners sign in an individual or part-
nership capacity and whether they claim to be individually liable for a
partnership debt.89
While such formalisms supported application of the test in
Champlin, they were disregarded in Foxman, in which the continuing
partners shared the obligation to make the payments.9 0 The continu-
ing partners signed checks and notes to the withdrawing partner on
behalf of the partnership. Those formalities notwithstanding, the ob-
ligation to make the payments was held to be upon the continuing
partners. As in Champlin, the result was consistent with the maker of
the payments test, but the court in Foxman, in applying the test,
viewed similar facts very differently.
In Cooney v. Commissioner,9 1 the court also addressed the issue of
the obligation to make payments to withdrawing partners, though the
outcome turned largely on the intent of the parties as expressed in
their agreement. The withdrawing partners, who urged that their
withdrawal constituted a sale of their interests, argued that the agree-
ment was signed by one of the continuing partners "[i]ndividually, for
and on behalf of the surviving partners." 92 The withdrawing partners
also argued that the continuing partners signed the notes to the with-
drawing partners.
The court deflected these contentions noting that the partnership
agreement provided that no partner could make commercial paper
without consent of all the partners.93 Promissory notes to the with-
drawing partners could be given only by an amendment to the part-
nership agreement or by having all of the partners sign. The
continuing partners thus signed to bind the partnership and not them-
selves. Citing Georgia law, however, the court conceded that an obli-
gation undertaken by all members of a partnership, within the scope
of its business, binds the partners individually as well as the
partnership.94
Although the placement of the obligation to make the payments is
highly relevant to the requirement in the regulations that liquidation
89. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 15 provides that all partners are jointly liable for all
debts and obligations of the partnership. Under § 42 a retiring partner is treated
as an ordinary creditor of the partnership with respect to the value of his interest
if the partnership business continues.
90. Supra note 83.
91. 65 T.C. 101 (1975).
92. 1&. at 111.
93. d.
94. Id at 112 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 75-302 (1973)). See also In Re R.P. Brown &
Co., 8 F.2d 53 (S.D. Ga. 1925) and Swygert Bros. v. Bank of Haralson, 13 Ga. App.
640, 79 S.E. 759 (1913).
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payments be made by the partnership, the same factors, particularly
in a general partnership, may evidence that both the partners and the
partnership are obligated to make the payments. In Sloan,95 the court
found a liquidation even though the evidence indicated a clear attempt
by the continuing partners to avoid joint and several liability as mem-
bers of the partnership for their individual shares of payments to the
withdrawing partner. The reasoning in the cases, centering on the ob-
ligation to make payments, does not provide very reliable guidance to
drafters of withdrawal agreements.
6. Intention of the Parties Test
Under this test the court must determine whether the parties in-
tended a withdrawal transaction to be a sale or a liquidation.96 This
test was the determining factor in Sloan. A commentator has referred
to its use in Sloan as "a curious subemphasis on substance within the
primary dominance of form."97 It involves a determination of
whether a sale or a liquidation was intended, often in the absence of
(but sometimes in spite of) a designation in the withdrawal agreement.
The intention is discerned from the agreement itself, the negotiations
between the parties, and from other surrounding circumstances.
The primary hazard entailed in such an analysis is that the parties
to withdrawal agreements do not always consider tax consequences in
a coherent fashion, 98 and even when they do, the language may be
hopelessly ambiguous. 99 Nevertheless, the cases which have turned
on the language used by the parties have, with some exceptions, pro-
vided the best guidance to drafters of withdrawal agreements.
Several cases have employed a "magic words" approach to agree-
ments. If the parties use the term "sale," the transaction is so re-
garded; if it is referred to as a "liquidation," or something other than a
sale, it is treated as a liquidation.
The rationale for this approach was set out most clearly in Emory
v. United States,100 in which the continuing partner in a two-person
partnership attempted to deduct payments made to the estate of the
deceased partner. The IRS contended that the transaction constituted
a sale. The pertinent portion of the partnership agreement provided
that upon the death of a partner, "the deceased partner's interest in
95. See notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
96. Swihart, supra note 39, at 1226.
97. Moore, supra note 80, at 615.
98. See Emory v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), affd, 490 F.2d
208 (6th Cir. 1974).
99. In Commissioner v. Jackson Inv. Co., 346 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1965), for in-
stance, the agreement provided that the payment to a withdrawing partner was
"a guaranteed payment, or a payment for good will." Whether it was one or the
other would make a great difference under § 736.
100. 374 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), affd, 490 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1974).
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said partnership shall be sold to and purchased by the surviving
partner."' 0 '
The court made a rare judicial attempt to distinguish between a
sale and a liquidation in economic terms.102 In upholding the IRS'
contention of a sale, the court determined that the sale language of the
agreement should be strictly construed, regardless of whether the par-
ties were aware of the tax consequences of that language. It held:
A strong reason for strictly construing terms such as "sale", "exchange",
"buy", "purchase", and "sell" as denoting a § 741 transaction and terms like
"liquidation", "winding up", "account", "liquidate", "settle", and "adjust" as
denoting a § 736 transaction is the public need for certainty in the tax law.
Liberal construction of these terms will create unnecessary litigation and con-
fusion as conflicting case law evolves.103
Other cases have found section 741 applicable where the withdrawal
agreement used sale terminology.104 On the other hand, the finding of
a liquidation in Cooney v. Commissioner'0 5 was based in part upon a
clause in the withdrawal agreement which referred to payments "in
liquidation of [the withdrawing partner's] partnership interest."0 6
At least a couple of decisions have found a liquidation largely on
the basis of the absence of terminology indicating a sale.107 This pre-
sumption is remarkable since the finding of a liquidation results in a
deduction for the continuing partners.108
Discerning the parties' intent strictly from the terminology in the
agreement presents the possibility for injustice or overreaching in in-
stances where the language used does not reflect the intent or agree-
101. 1& at 1052-53 (emphasis in original).
102. The court held:
A sale is a bilateral act of parties acting at arms' length which concludes
with a property exchange. Inherent in a sale is a fixed or readily ascer-
tainable amount of money, which is traded for something of value. In
contrast, a liquidation is the process of reducing assets to cash, discharg-
ing liabilities and dividing surplus or loss. If the business continues, sur-
plus or loss is determined by an accounting;, and, the remaining partners
pay the withdrawing partners for their interests. Thus, in a liquidation
the amount received is contingent upon the financial condition of the
business at the time of dissolution.
Id at 1055. On appeal this reasoning was approved by the Sixth Circuit.
103. Id at 1054-55.
104. See Boland v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1145 (1972), affd, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d
Cir. 1974); Foxman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 535 (1964), affd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir.
1965); Atkinson v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 834 (1964) and Wheeling v.
Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 778 (1964).
105. 65 T.C. 101 (1975).
106. Id at 110.
107. Miller v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 331 (1967); Stilwell v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.
247 (1966).
108. See Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134,
148-49 (1974); Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943)
(holding that deductions, as a matter of legislative grace, are construed strictly).
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ment of the parties or the economic reality of the transaction. Just
how far a court may go beyond the words of the agreement in deter-
mining the intent of the parties is unclear. The two decisions which
address that issue explicitly are not consistent with each other. In Co-
ven v. Commissioner,O9 the taxpayer, following his withdrawal from
a partnership, was to receive payments of $25,000 per year from 1966
to 1990. The agreement was designated a "Consultant Contract." The
IRS argued that the payments were liquidation payments under sec-
tion 736 or, in the alternative, compensation for services under section
61. Although the court found that the agreement provided that the
payments were compensation for services, it upheld the withdrawing
partner's position that the transaction was a sale.
With respect to the Commissioner's argument that the payments
constituted compensation for services, the court found that the tax-
payer presented "strong proof' that the form of the contract did not
reflect its substance.l 10 In making this finding the court referred to
evidence indicating, among other things, that the payments could have
continued long after the death of the taxpayer, that the taxpayer had
not been called upon formally to render services under the contract,
and that the taxpayer did not expect to render consulting services
when the agreement was executed. In disregarding the terms of the
agreement to characterize the payments as a sale, the court cited Ull-
man v. Commissioner"'l and Schmitz v. Commissioner.1 2 Neither
Ullman nor Schmitz purport to require the degree of "strong proof'
required in another leading case, Commissioner v. Danielson,13 to
overcome the effects of the express terms of an agreement.
Danielson involved taxpayers who had sold stock in a corporation.
The sales agreements allocated well over half of the purchase price to
covenants not to compete. The allocation was made by the purchaser,
and the sellers were not informed that this allocation would result in
much of their gain being treated as ordinary income. The taxpayers
reported their gain as capital gain and the Tax Court, despite the allo-
cation in the agreement, found for the taxpayers. 1 4
The Tax Court's decision was based on the ultimate finding that
the allocation to the covenant not to compete had no relationship to
business reality.115 One of the factual findings upon which that con-
clusion was based was that the agreement left the sellers free to set up
109. 66 T.C. 295 (1976).
110. IdM at 304.
111. 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959).
112. 51 T.C. 306 (1968), affd sub nom Throndson v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 1022 (9th
Cir. 1972).
113. 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 389 U.S. 858 (1967).
114. Comissioner v. Danielson, 44 T.C. 549 (1965), rev'd, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.) (en
banc), cert denied, 389 U.S. 858 (1967).
115. Id. at 556.
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a business which could compete with the buyer.116 The court also
noted that there were no separate negotiations concerning the cove-
nant not to compete.
The Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court. It accepted the Com-
missioner's argument that permitting a taxpayer to attack an explicit
allocation to a covenant not to compete "would encourage parties un-
justifiably to risk litigation after consummation of a transaction in or-
der to avoid the tax consequences of their agreements."117 The court
held that the "strong proof" necessary to overcome the consequences
of the terms of an agreement is that which "would be admissible to
alter [its] construction or to show its unenforceability because of mis-
take, undue influence, fraud, duress, etc."118
The holding of the Tax Court in Coven is obviously not consistent
with the Third Circuit's decision in Danielson. Coven allows a court
considerably more flexibility in looking behind the terms of an agree-
ment to determine the intent of the parties.
The caveat vendor approach of Danielson was applied by the Fifth
Circuit in Spector v. Commissioner.119 In that case the taxpayer, a
member of an accounting partnership, wished to sell his practice to
another firm. The purchasing firm agreed to buy the taxpayer's prac-
tice for $96,000, payable in four annual installments of $24,000. The
agreement provided that these payments were to be "for services or
for the use of capital as a 'guaranteed payment'...."120
The agreement also appears to have very clearly outlined the tax
consequences intended by the parties. It specifically stated that the
meaning of guaranteed payments shall be "the definition provided for
such term in Section 707 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and
Regulation Section 1.707-1(c)."'121 The IRS required the taxpayer to
report the entire amount of the payments as ordinary income.
The Tax Court, notwithstanding the terms of the withdrawal
agreement, ruled in favor of the taxpayer, holding that he had ad-
duced strong proof that the agreement did not reflect the economic
reality of the transaction. 2 2 The Tax Court found that although there
had been a merger of the taxpayer's practice with the partnership
which made the payments, the taxpayer withdrew from the surviving
partnership two days following the merger. Consequently, the court
found that the taxpayer never entered into a partnership with mem-
116. Id.
117. Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 389
U.S. 858 (1967).
118. Id
119. 641 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1981), on remand, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 631 (1982).
120. Id. at 378.
121. Id.
122. Spector v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1017, 1022 (1979), rev'd, 641 F.2d 376 (5th Cir.
1981).
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bers of the surviving partnership.123 This was based on a finding that
the taxpayer did not intend to contribute services or capital to the
merged partnership. 124 Concluding that section 736 can apply only to
payments made by a partnership to one of its partners, the court held
that the transaction constituted a sale of the taxpayer's share of his
partnership goodwill to the surviving partnership.
The Tax Court conceded the difficulties involved in permitting a
taxpayer to attack the form of a transaction when tax consequences of
a third party may be involved. The court held, however, that the pos-
sibility of a "whipsaw" of the government did not preclude a tax-
payer's resort to the "strong proof" rule. The court cited Coven and
Schmitz rather than Danielson as setting forth the strong proof rule.
In reversing the Tax Court, the Fifth Circuit held, in effect, that
the "strong proof" test applied by the Tax Court allowed a party too
much latitude in avoiding the tax consequences mandated by the form
of the transaction. It adopted the more stringent Danielson approach
and remanded the case for a determination of whether the taxpayer
had adduced proof of mistake, fraud, undue influence or any other
ground that would be sufficient to set aside the agreement, or whether
the payments were for goodwill.12 5 The Fifth Circuit, noting that
there is little difference, in an economic sense, between a sale under
section 741 and a liquidation under section 736, denigrated the Tax
Court's inquiry into whether the agreement comported with economic
reality.1 26
The court's analysis missed the point of the Tax Court's holding,
however. The Tax Court held that the taxpayer could not realistically
have been viewed as ever having been a partner in the surviving part-
nership. Thus, section 736 could not possibly have been applicable re-
gardless of the form of the agreement. In its insistence on making the
taxpayer live with the words of the agreement, the Fifth Circuit over-
looked the requirement of the regulations that payments, if they are
to be within the ambit of section 736, must be made by a partnership to
a partner.
The Tax Court in Kelly v. Commissioner12 7 had previously held
that section 736 could not apply to payments by a partnership to an
individual who had never become a member of the surviving partner-
ship at any time. While the Fifth Circuit, with its restrictive view of
123. Id at 1024.
124. In making the determination, the court relied on the familiar test of Commis-
sioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949), which examines whether "the par-
ties in good faith and acting with a business purpose intended to join together in
the present conduct of the enterprise."
125. Spector v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 376, 386 (5th Cir. 1981).
126. Id at 383-84.
127. 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1090 (1970).
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the strong proof rule, appears to have limited the choices in this con-
text to sections 736 and 741, decisions such as Coven and Kelly may
provide a basis for avoidance of section 736 treatment in other circuits.
Thus, while the application of the intent of the parties test by the
courts may provide the drafters of withdrawal agreements some gui-
dance, it is not entirely clear what factors the courts will examine in
order to determine this intent. A review of the tests outlined by Pro-
fessor Swihart indicates that in over thirty years the courts have been
unable to articulate a method for distinguishing Tweedledum from
Tweedledee with sufficient certainty to give drafters of agreements
the reliable flexibility that was purportedly the aim of Subchapter K.
IV. THE "ADVANTAGES" OF SECTION 736 FROM A POLICY
STANDPOINT: ARE THEY APPROPRIATE?
The advantages most often attributed to the statutory scheme for
partnership withdrawals are predictability and flexibility. As the pre-
vious section indicates, the factors which differentiate sections 736 and
741 have not been applied very predictably. Assuming, for purposes of
discussion, that the parties to a withdrawal agreement are able to set
out the tax consequences in a manner which the courts will regard as
controlling, the very fact that the partners have a range of choices
available to them under section 736 raises significant tax policy ques-
tions. These questions arise because the "flexibility" embodied in sec-
tion 736 provides partners the ability to shift income in relation to the
income tax brackets of the parties, to deduct payments which repre-
sent the cost of a capital outlay, and to deduct payments which repre-
sent the cost of mutual insurance. Although in some respects these
advantages are unique to the partnership area, there is really no justi-
fication for them from a policy point of view.128
The first two benefits which spring from the flexibility of section
736, the ability to shift income among taxpayers by agreement and the
deductibility of payments which constitute a capital outlay, are obvi-
ously not touted by the House or Senate reports for Subchapter K.129
Both stem largely from section 736(b)(2)(B), which treats payments
for partnership goodwill as payments for partnership property only if
the withdrawal agreement specifically indicates that they are for good-
128. A major impetus for the Administration's proposal for tax reform generally is a
desire to eliminate unique advantages for particular taxpayers. As the summary
of President Reagan's May, 1985 proposal states: "[Americans] can't understand
the logic or equity of people in seemingly similar situations paying dramatically
different amounts of tax." The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fair-
ness, Growth, and Simplicity 1 (May 1985), reprinted in FED. TAXES (P-H) 1
59,605 (Bulletin 25 EXTRA) (May 30, 1985).
129. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) and S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1954).
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will. If a portion of the payments to a withdrawing partner are allo-
cated to goodwill by the withdrawal agreement, the payments are not
income to the recipient or deductible by the continuing partners. The
statute, as indicated in the regulations, does not purport to provide an
ability to characterize payments as allocable to goodwill beyond the
reasonable value of partnership goodwill.130 A valuation placed upon
goodwill by an arm's length agreement, however, is presumptively
reasonable.
The statute and the regulations, of course, permit the partners to
allocate none of the consideration to goodwill even in instances where
a substantial portion of a withdrawing partner's interest is indisputa-
bly attributable to goodwill. By providing such an unfettered ability to
treat payments for goodwill as payments under section 736(a), the
statute permits deduction of payments which represent the cost of a
capital asset.1 31 Even if this flexibility is limited to goodwill, it is con-
siderable nonetheless, particularly in service partnerships where
goodwill and receivables constitute most of the assets.1 3 2 In actuality,
however, the flexibility of valuation is not limited to goodwill, since
the regulations provide that the arm's length valuation placed upon a
partner's interest in property other than goodwill is also presumed
correct.
1 3 3
The flexibility to value goodwill may be justified on the basis that
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(b)(3) provides:
(3) For the purposes of section 736(b) and this paragraph, payments
made to a retiring partner or to a successor in interest of a deceased part-
ner in exchange for the interest of such partner in partnership property
shall not include any amount paid for the partner's share of good will of
the partnership in excess of its partnership basis, including any special
basis adjustments for it to which such partner is entitled, except to the
extent that the partnership agreement provides for a reasonable pay-
ment with respect to such good will. Such payments shall be considered
as payments under section 736(a). To the extent that the partnership
agreement provides for a reasonable payment with respect to good will,
such payments shall be treated under section 736(b) and this paragraph.
Generally, the valuation placed upon good will by an arm's length agree-
ment of the partners, whether specific in amount or determined by a
formula, shall be regarded as correct.
131. This flexibility is somewhat akin to that possessed by the buyers and sellers of a
business with respect to allocation of consideration between good will and a cove-
nant not to compete. Allocation of consideration to a covenant not to compete
permits the buyer to deduct such portion which, at the same time, becomes ordi-
nary gain to the seller. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text. The as-
signment of value to the covenant not to compete is not controlling in the same
manner as the failure to designate payments in a partnership as good will. Courts
are still free to test the allocation to the covenant not to compete for its economic
substantiality. 2 B. BITKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIrS
51.9.3 (1981).
132. Martin, Liquidation and Sale of a Partnership Interest, 25 S. CAL. TAX INST. 433,
447 (1972).
133. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(b) (1).
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it is relatively difficult to assign a value to an essentially evanescent
commodity.13 4 Nevertheless, the Tax Court has at times demon-
strated an ability to calculate the value of goodwill involved in the
transfer of a partnership interest.13 5
A. Trading of Tax Benefits
The ease with which section 736(a) permits the payments to a with-
drawing partner, particularly those for goodwill, to be characterized as
deductible or non-deductible, enables the parties to a withdrawal
agreement to negotiate tax benefits and price without regard to eco-
nomic realities. The lure of this opportunity has not been lost on com-
mentators. For instance, two advise:
A planning device in this area is to adjust the portion allocated to goodwill
depending upon the effective tax brackets of the retiring and remaining part-
ners. As a rule of thumb, there is less overall tax to the group when no alloca-
tion is made to goodwill under Section 736(b) if the retiring partner's tax rate
is less than one and two-thirds the effective tax rate savings to the remaining
partners. 1 3
6
There is a generalized resistance in the law of taxation to giving
tax effect to transactions with no economic consequences other than
tax avoidance.137 In the recent past, Congress has taken dramatic
steps to reduce naked trading of tax advantages in the partnership
area.138 The courts,13 9 and now the Reagan Administration, 140 have
manifested an intention to prevent shifting of income among taxpay-
134. 6 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION § 35.89 (1985).
135. See, e.g., Rudd v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 225 (1982); Brooks v. Commissioner, 36
T.C. 1128 (1961); Horton v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 143 (1949), appeal dismissed,
180 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1950). In Rudd the taxpayer sought to deduct a loss upon
the abandonment of his interest in the firm name. The Tax Court found that 20%
of the good will of the firm was allocable to the partnership name. That a court
may so specifically make an allocation of basis to a particular item of good will
makes it strange that Congress in § 736(b)(2)(B) should have permitted partners
to disregard entirely the value of good will.
136. Morgan and Larason, Tax Effects of Partners' Departure Can be Tailored to Meet
Parties' Needs, 12 TAX. FOR LAw. 132, 137 (1983) (footnote omitted). See also
Moore, supra note 80, in which the author provides a complicated formula to en-
able a party to benefit from a trade of price for tax benefits.
137. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Commissioner v. Court Holding
Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Boyter v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981).
138. As a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, P.L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1548 (I.R.C.
§ 704(b)), allocations of partnership items of income and loss must possess sub-
stantial economic effect. Under § 465, also part of the 1976 Tax Reform Act and
which was strengthened by the Revenue Act of 1978, P.L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat.
2814, a partner is generally permitted to deduct losses only to the extent he is at
risk in the venture. Section 183, which is designed to limit losses from activities
not engaged in for profit, is being used with considerable success in attacking
deductions and losses in activities where there appears little chance of economic
success. See Barnard v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1984); Fuchs v. Com-
missioner, 83 T.C. 79 (1984); Dean v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 56 (1984) (ventures to
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ers to minimize taxes. Curiously, however, section 736 permits trading
and shifting of income akin to that available between the parties to a
divorce under section 71.141
This flexibility is not available upon the sale of a partnership inter-
est. Under section 741, except where section 751 is applicable, the
amount received by a withdrawing partner in excess of the basis of his
interest is capital gain. If the partnership interest involves an interest
in unrealized receivables or substantially appreciated inventory, it is
clear in the regulations that the seller must allocate to this property a
portion of the amount realized equal to the market value of the prop-
erty.1 42 The regulations provide that an arm's length allocation of a
portion of the consideration to unrealized receivables or substantially
appreciated inventory will be regarded as correct.143 The temptation
to resort to trading on the basis of tax brackets or shifting of income is
not as great as with section 736, since under section 741 the considera-
tion paid to the withdrawing partner, regardless of the nature of the
assets involved in the partnership, is regarded as a capital outlay and is
not currently deductible by the purchaser.144
When a sale of a partnership interest is involved, a court is not
precluded from finding that a portion of the sale price in excess of the
fair market value of other partnership assets is allocable to goodwill,
even though the parties to the agreement have made no such alloca-
tion. Thus, when a sale is involved, a court has greater freedom to
exploit books held not for profit); Brannen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 471 (1982)
(same, venture to exploit a film).
139. See, e.g., Schulz v. Commissioner, 686 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1982); Estate of Margita
Applestein v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 331 (1983).
140. In articulating the rationale for its provisions to curb income shifting within the
family, the report on the President's tax proposals states: "[income shifting un-
dermines the progressive rate structure, and results in unequal treatment of tax-
payers with the same ability to pay tax." The President's Tax Proposals to the
Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity, supra note 128, at 84.
141. The justification for allowing the paying spouse to shift, in some circumstances,
taxation on alimony payments to the recipient was that denial of a deduction to
the paying spouse was increasingly leaving such spouses without enough money
to pay their taxes. 88 CONG. REC. 6575 (1942) (remarks of Rep. Disney). No such
justification has ever been advanced for § 736.
142. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g) example 1. The seller's basis for such property is the ba-
sis he would take under § 732 if the property were distributed to him in a current
distribution. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a)(2). Generally, this is the basis of the part-
nership in such property to the extent it does not exceed the distributee's basis in
his partnership interest.
143. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a)(2).
144. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. Concededly, if there is an election
under § 754 in effect, there may be an incentive for the continuing partners to
have as much of the consideration as possible allocated to § 751 property so as to
have as high a basis as possible for the partnership for property the disposition of
which generates ordinary income.
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scrutinize the economic substance of the transaction, to examine what
is being sold.
Commentators differ as to the degree to which drafters of agree-
ments may, practically speaking, disregard economic reality in allocat-
ing the value of a partnership interest to deductible or nondeductible
payments. One advises caution in situations in which dealings among
the parties are not at arm's length.145 Another, however, opines that
even with respect to allocations between payments that represent the
value of assets other than goodwill, whether non-deductible under sec-
tion 736(b) or deductible under section 736(a), "it is unlikely that [an]
agreed allocation would be challenged." 146
To the extent that liquidation payments are attributable to the
value of a withdrawing partner's share of partnership receivables,
treatment under section 736(a) is not particularly troublesome. The
withdrawing partner would report these amounts as income if he re-
mained in the partnership and received them as a distributive share.
When the total amount of withdrawal payments is in excess of the
value of the withdrawing partner's share of the receivables, the ines-
capable conclusion is that the continuing partners are buying some-
thing other than the withdrawing partner's share of the receivables.
Allowing a deduction for these excess amounts is troublesome indeed.
Yet section 736(b)(2)(B) effectively allows the partners that deduc-
tion. To the extent that the continuing partners receive deductions
for amounts paid to the withdrawing partner in excess of the with-
drawing partner's share of the receivables, ordinary income is being
shifted from the continuing partners to the withdrawing partner.
Case law demonstrate the degree to which parties to withdrawal
agreements are free to shift this income. In Smith v. Commis-
sioner,147 the taxpayer was expelled from a partnership by vote of the
other partners. For his interest, which had a book value of $53,264.61,
the taxpayer received a payment of $77,000.148 He reported the
145. Nash, How to Evaluate the Tax Consequences When a Partner Retires or Sells His
Interest, 4 TAx. FOR LAw. 28, 32 (1975).
146. Solomon, How Use of Section 736 Enhances Planning in Liquidating Partnership
Interests, 51 J. TAX. 347, 348 (1979).
147. 37 T.C. 1033 (1962), alf'd, 313 F.2d 16 (10th Cir. 1962).
148. Book value was defined under the partnership agreement as follows:
The amounts of capital contributed by each partner and the amounts
of his share of the earnings left in the business, his accrued salary, and of
advances to him by way of loan or against future anticipated distribu-
tions shall be kept in one or more separate accounts as the partners find
convenient. The net balance of these accounts standing as a credit of a
partner shall be considered as the book value of his interest in the part-
nership as carried on the books of the partnership. In determining the
value or the book value of a deceased or a retiring partner's interest, no
value shall be assigned to good will, to the right to use the firm name, or
to office records such as, but not limited to, lists of clients, files, or statis-
tical data.
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$23,735.39 difference as capital gain. The withdrawal agreement did
not provide that any of the payment was attributable to goodwill.
Under section 736, therefore, the portion of the payment which ex-
ceeded the book value of the taxpayer's interest could not be regarded
as section 736(b) payments for property; it had to be treated as a pay-
ment under section 736(a). Since the partnership used the accrual
method of reporting, none of the value of the payments should have
been attributable to unrealized receivables under section 736(b). To
the extent the taxpayer would be required to take these payments at-
tributable to receivables into income because of section 736(a), he
would be required to report income with respect to these items a sec-
ond time. Correspondingly, the continuing partners would receive a
deduction for amounts which would not have represented ordinary in-
come to the withdrawing partner if he had remained in the partner-
ship and received the payments as distributions.
Although the premium paid by the partnership clearly appeared to
represent goodwill, the Tax Court followed section 736(b)(2)(B) and
refused to characterize it as such. In language that must give solace to
commentators who claim that section 736 gives considerable latitude
to draftsmen seeking to avoid economic reality, the court held:
A requirement that in every case courts search for the intent of partners or
attempt their own characterization of premiums provided for in partnership
agreements would substantially eliminate the aspect of certainty and simplic-
ity sought for by Congress. We cannot say that such a search is never appro-
priate under the present statutory language. However, we see nothing in the
record and briefs before us that justifies an interpretation of the statute re-
quiring or permitting us to do other than ascertain whether the partnership
agreement refers to the premium in question as goodwill. 1 4 9
The court was unconcerned with exactly what the premium repre-
sented, as long as it was not specifically identified as attributable to
goodwill. The IRS, in arguing that it was something other than good-
will, suggested that it was "in the nature of a mutual insurance or de-
terrent to hasty decisions to expel a partner." 5 0 In urging that the
withdrawing partner be required to report the payment as ordinary
income because of section 736, the IRS essentially advocated allowing
the continuing partners a deduction. It is surprising that the IRS
would urge deductibility of a payment which, even if it is to deter ex-
pulsion of a partner, is made in connection with the acquisition of his
interest'51 or constitutes insurance.152 The court required the tax-
payer to treat the premium as ordinary income.
Id at 1034.
149. Id. at 1037 (footnote omitted).
150. Id. at 1036.
151. As a general proposition, amounts paid with respect to the acquisition of property
are not deductible under § 263. See Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572
(1970). Payments remarkably similar to those in Smith were held to be capital in
a case involving the 1939 Code. Kenworthy v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH)
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A similar result occurred in Cooney v. Commissioner,5 3 in which
the IRS sought to deny deductions for payments by continuing part-
ners to withdrawing partners. As discussed earlier, the Tax Court
found that the transaction was a liquidation rather than a sale. In
Cooney, the IRS, echoing the argument of the taxpayer in Smith, con-
tended that while a value of $271,214.88 had been assigned to the re-
ceivables by the partnership agreement, their value did not exceed
$75,000. The IRS argued that the difference between those figures
represented goodwill. The court regarded itself as precluded by sec-
tion 736(b)(2)(B) from making that finding. Although the court stated
that it did not intend to hold "that partners are free to disregard objec-
tive facts in structuring their liquidation agreements," 54 it is difficult
to imagine circumstances under which the Tax Court would require
an allocation of value to goodwill when none has been made in the
agreement. 55
If the partners do make an allocation of liquidation payments to
goodwill, the amount of the payments so allocated is controlled by sec-
tion 736(b). To the extent that that allocation results in undervalua-
tion of the withdrawing partner's share of the receivables, his share of
ordinary income is shifted to the continuing partners. As noted ear-
lier, commentators on section 736 differ as to the degree of latitude the
parties have in allocating the value of the withdrawing partner's inter-
est between 736(a) and 736(b) payments. The regulations provide that
the allocation to goodwill must be a "reasonable payment."S6
The case law also provides conflicting signals as to the degree of
latitude partners have in allocating payments between deductible sec-
tion 736(a) payments and payments for partnership property other
than goodwill. In Jacobs v. Commissioner,157 the taxpayer was paid
$35,000 by the partnership upon his withdrawal. In asserting that the
taxpayer should report this as ordinary income, the IRS argued that
60, affid, 197 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1952). See also Sperling v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.
1014 (1953); Davis v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 218 (1932).
152. Section 264 denies deduction of amounts paid in connection with certain life in-
surance contracts and Treas. Reg. § 1.264-1(b) extends this to life insurance
purchased by a partnership for the benefit of partners. Payments made in Smith,
if made upon death or retirement of a partner, might easily be seen as a substitute
for life insurance.
153. 65 T.C. 101 (1975).
154. IdM at 112.
155. In Spector the Fifth Circuit, after holding that the Tax Court had incorrectly
applied the strong proof rule in holding for the taxpayer, specified that the Tax
Court might consider whether the payments were for good will. The court deter-
mined that it was precluded from making such a finding by § 736(b)(2)(B) be-
cause none of the documents pertaining to the taxpayer's withdrawal contained
any indication that the payments were for good will.
156. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(b)(3).
157. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 848 (1974).
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the taxpayer's interest in the firm's receivables at the time of his with-
drawal was $61,622.24.158 The court noted, however, that under the
partnership agreement the taxpayer forfeited his interest in the re-
ceivables by his withdrawal.159 It was apparently very clear from the
record that the parties agreed to allocate the consideration paid the
taxpayer to goodwill rather than to receivables. Accordingly, the
court upheld the allocation to goodwill.
The allocation agreement upheld in Jacobs, however, flies in the
face of section 736(b)(2)(A), which provides that payments for unreal-
ized receivables are to be regarded as section 736(a) payments. It does
not seem appropriate to permit partners to disregard over $62,000 of
receivables through a legerdemain in a partnership agreement. Con-
cededly, the remaining partners in Jacobs would have to reckon with
the ordinary income involved in the taxpayer's share of the receiv-
ables. The tax law, however, does not generally allow such a high de-
gree of flexibility in deciding where the burden of taxation will fall.160
Not all courts have been unwilling to examine economic substance
when confronted with allocations between section 736(a) and (b) pay-
ments to a withdrawing partner.1 61 Nevertheless, the opportunity to
158. The taxpayer received no other payment which might be regarded as having been
attributable to the receivables.
159. Jacobs v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 848, 856 (1974).
160. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). In Trousdale v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.
1056, 1065 (1951), aff'd, 219 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1955), a case involving the 1939
Code, the Tax Court held: "The fundamental principle in all income tax statutes
is to tax income to those who earn or otherwise create the right to receive it."
161. In Hale v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1497 (1965), the continuing members
of a partnership wished to treat payments to withdrawing partners as deductible
§ 736(a) payments. The Tax Court appropriately placed the burden upon the con-
tinuing partners seeking a deduction:
Petitioners have not adduced any evidence showing that the total liq-
uidating payments made by [the partnership to the withdrawing part-
ners] were in excess of the reasonable or fair market value of their
partnership interests ... when such payments were made ....
Id at 1509.
In Frankfort v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 163 (1969) the taxpayer, the surviving
member of a two person partnership, sought to deduct payments that were made
pursuant to the partnership agreement to his mother, widow of his deceased part-
ner. The Commissioner denied the taxpayer's deduction of such payments on the
basis, in part, that they were nondeductible personal expenses. The Tax Court
upheld the taxpayer on the basis that most of the assets of the partnership con-
sisted of receivables and that such payments were allocable to the receivables.
Highlighting the possibility of income shifting without regard to economic sub-
stance the court stated:
In so holding, we wish to make clear that we are not passing upon the
question whether partners may effectively spell out in their agreement
to what payments, if any, the unrealized receivables may or may not be
allocated and thus fix as among themselves their respective tax liabilities
upon the liquidation or sale of a partnership interest.
Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
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shift ordinary income under section 736 is not justified by the pur-
ported certainty that that section is designed to facilitate. As dis-
cussed earlier, that certainty does not really exist.
B. Deductibility of Payments That Constitute Capital Expenditures
Payments not specifically identified as goodwill are not deductible
to continuing partners because these expenditures meet the require-
ments of deductibility under some other section of the Code (such as
section 162 business expenses). Deductibility is provided on the basis
of meeting the formality of section 736(b)(2)(B). The flexibility per-
mitted in the allocation of consideration between payments for part-
nership property and those not for partnership property creates
considerable latitude to provide deductibility for payments which
truly represent to the continuing partners the purchase price of an
additional partnership interest. If the ability under section 736 to shift
income attributable to receivables is questionable from a tax policy
standpoint, the ability to deduct the purchase price of a partnership
interest is even more questionable. One commentator on section 736
indicates: "If one were to suggest to a tax practitioner that a current
deduction could be obtained for a large portion of the purchase price
of a depreciable asset, it would be greeted by skepticism at best. How-
ever, Section 736 does provide this opportunity."16 2
This suggestion may be illustrated by the following example. As-
sume that the ABC Partnership is composed of three equal partners,
A, B, and C, and that the value of each partner's interest is $30,000.
Assume also that A's interest consists of $10,000 of receivables, $10,000
of tangible property other than receivables and $10,000 of partnership
goodwill. On A's withdrawal, B and C agree to make payments to him
of $30,000. If section 741 were applied to this transaction, all of the
payments would be nondeductible to B and C, even those representing
the value of the receivables.16 3 That is because the acquisition of an
additional partnership interest is treated as a capital transaction 64
and is reckoned with by the acquiring partners as any other property
acquisitions, in adjustments to basis.165 If section 736 were applied,
and the parties do not allocate $10,000 of the consideration to goodwill,
the continuing partners (B and C) will be able to deduct payments to
that extent. And to the extent that the parties agree to allocate less
than $10,000 of the consideration to partnership property other than
162. Solomon, supra note 146, at 349.
163. 3 B. BrrriER, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GiHTS 1] 87.13
n.30 (1981).
164. Kenworthy v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1952); Lehman v. Commis-
sioner, 7 T.C. 1088 (1946), qffjd, 165 F.2d 383 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 819
(1948).
165. I.R.C. § 742.
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goodwill and receivables, the continuing partners receive deductions
for payments which clearly constitute a capital outlay. This clearly
should not occur under section 736(b) but, as discussed earlier, com-
mentators have indicated that it can occur because the regulations
provide that an arm's length agreement will be controlling.166
As a general rule of federal income taxation, the cost of acquisition
of a capital asset is not deductible.167 There is no justification for al-
lowing a partnership as an entity to deduct acquisition costs that tax-
payers generally cannot deduct, and that even partners individually,
purchasing a partnership interest when section 741 is applicable, can-
not deduct. This is particularly so in light of the fact that the partners
would, except to the extent section 751 is applicable, receive capital
gains treatment on any gain recognized from the sale of the interest
purchased.
C. Deduction of Payments That Amount to Mutual Insurance
Among Partners
In enacting Subchapter K, Congress recognized that provisions for
retirement or liquidation payments in partnership agreements are
often in the nature of mutual insurance. Payments to a withdrawing
partner or his estate may be a substitute for a pension or life insurance
rather than payments for partnership property. To the extent section
736(a) is applicable to these payments, it provides a deduction for pay-
ments which are clearly for a personal purpose. This, of course, is not
generally permitted under section 262. Individuals are not permitted
to deduct life insurance premiums,168 and deductions for pension con-
tributions are allowed only in carefully delineated circumstances. 169
If the members of a partnership purchase life insurance or make pen-
sion contributions individually, they are subject to these same
limitations.
A commentator has provided an example of how section 736 pay-
ments may serve as a substitute for life insurance to the benefit of the
continuing partners.170 The example assumes that the partners desire
to provide $100,000, net of tax, to the estate of any deceased partner. If
they arrange to do so through payments under section 736(a), and the
estate is in the 30% income tax bracket, they must pay $144,000 to the
estate. If the surviving partners are in the 50% bracket, their cost will
166. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 151.
168. I.R.C. § 264.
169. Contributions to and distributions from individual retirement accounts are care-
fully regulated under § 219. The same is true for plans for employees and self-
employed individuals. See I.R.C. §§ 72, 402, 403, 415.
170. See Horvitz, supra note 38, at 868-70.
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be only $72,000. The Treasury will be a co-insurer of the withdrawing
partner in the amount of $28,000.
Again, the partnership as an entity is permitted a deduction which
would not be allowed the partners as individuals. There is no differ-
ence between the partnership as an entity and as an aggregate which
justifies this cost to the Treasury.17'
To the extent that a deduction is allowed for payments to a retired
partner (the equivalent of a pension), section 736 is a means by which
a business organization, a partnership, may provide for pensions com-
pletely outside the antidiscrimination and minimum standards appli-
cable to deductible pension contributions generally.172 Thus, a
partnership is permitted to discriminate between principals and em-
ployees and to deduct excess pension payments in a manner not per-
mitted any other business organization. This advantage to a
partnership is both inequitable and unjustified.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
The confusion involved in distinguishing between a sale and a liq-
uidation has frustrated Congress' attempt to bring some certainty to
the law of partnership withdrawals. Yet no analytical approach ap-
pears to resolve this confusion. The concept of a section 736 liquida-
tion rests upon an emphasis on the partnership as an entity. There is
no principled reason that simple compliance with a statutory formality
should create such a dramatic difference in tax consequences between
a liquidation and a sale. Further, the deduction provided in the con-
text of section 736 liquidations creates undesirable consequences in
terms of tax policy. Section 736 should be repealed and section 741
amended to add at the end of that section the following sentence:
A liquidation of a partner's interest, as defined in section 761(d), shall be con-
sidered as the sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership. 1 73
171. Although it is true that an employer may deduct the cost of life insurance policies
on the lives of employees under § 162 if it can be shown that (1) the payments are
in the nature of additional compensation, (2) the total amount of all compensa-
tion, including insurance, is not unreasonable, and (3) the employer is not directly
or indirectly a beneficiary under the policy, see Rev. Rul. 58-90, 1958-1 C.B. 88, it
is quite clear that the relationship among parties is not regarded as an employer-
employee relationship, which would permit deduction. Congress recognized this
in 1982 when it extended the partnership rules to 2% shareholders in S corpora-
tions. See I.R.C. § 1372.
172. See I.R.C. §§ 401, 410, 411.
173. Thus, § 741 would read as follows:
In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, gain
or loss shall be recognized to the transferor partner. Such gain or loss
shall be considered as gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset, except as otherwise provided in section 751 (relating to unrealized
receivables and inventory items which have appreciated substantially in
value). A liquidation of a partner's interest as defined in section 761(d),
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Section 731 would still generally control recognition of gain or loss.174
Modification of other statutory provisions would facilitate the
above change. Section 708(b)(1)(B),175 which provides that a partner-
ship terminates upon the sale or exchange of fifty percent or more of
the total interest in partnership capital and profits, should be re-
pealed. The regulations now provide that it does not apply to liquida-
tions,176 but in view of the discussion above, there is often so little
difference between sales and liquidations that it is not rational to let
one result in termination and not the other.1 77
Congress should also repeal the section 754 election whereby the
basis of partnership property is adjusted to reflect the cost of partner-
ship interests upon a transfer under section 743(b),178 or to reflect the
gain or loss to a distributee in partnership distributions under section
734(b).179 The repeal of this election provision is essential to ensure
that basis adjustments always serve the role of the deduction now pro-
vided continuing partners under section 736(a). To the extent that a
withdrawing partner has recognized ordinary income because part of
his gain is attributable to unrealized receivables, the continuing part-
ners should receive a step-up in basis for that ordinary income prop-
shall be considered as the sale or exchange of an interest in a partner-
ship. (amended portion emphasized).
174. Under § 731 gain is recognized on a distribution by a partnership to a partner only
to the extent that money distributed exceeds the distributee's adjusted basis of
his partnership interest immediately before the distribution. No loss is recog-
nized on a distribution to a partner unless such distribution is in liquidation of the
partner's interest and the distributee receives only money, unrealized receivables
or inventory and the amount of money or the basis to the distributee of the un-
realized receivables or inventory is less than the adjusted basis of the distributee's
partnership interest.
175. I.R.C. § 708(b)(1)(B).
176. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(ii).
177. Termination of the partnership may often be disadvantageous. It may result in
loss of the partnership's taxable year, see, 2 A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P.
PosTLEwAITE, supra note 45, at § 132.02 and in recognition of gain in a construc-
tive disposition of the partnership's assets. Id. at § 132.03. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-l(b)(1)(iv).
178. Under § 743(b), when the election under § 754 is in effect, if a partner, upon the
acquisition of a partnership interest pays more than the aggregate of the adjusted
bases of his proportionate share of partnership properties to the partnership, the
bases of such properties for the partner are adjusted upward to reflect his
purchase price. If such partner pays less than the bases of such property to the
partnership they are adjusted downward to reflect that.
179. Under § 734(b), if the election under § 754 is in effect, the basis of remaining part-
nership property is adjusted after distributions as follows: it is adjusted upward
to the extent a distributee recognizes gain on a distribution or must decrease the
basis of distributed property because it exceeds the basis of his partnership inter-
est; it is adjusted downward to the extent that a distributee recognizes a loss as a
distribution or must adjust the basis of distributed property upward because it is
less than the adjusted basis of his partnership interest.
[Vol. 65:450
PARTNERSHIP TAXATION
erty to offset any gain upon collection.180
In the absence of section 736, all gain recognized by a withdrawing
partner, except that attributable to unrealized receivables or substan-
tially appreciated inventory under section 751, would be capital gain.
That is appropriate because the consideration paid upon transfer of a
partnership interest which is not attributable to section 751 is neces-
sarily attributable to some other type of partnership property. The
acquiring partners, whether as a partnership or as individuals, would
not get a deduction for any payments to the withdrawing partner.
That is appropriate since in acquiring a partnership interest they are
making a capital outlay. The revisions proposed in this article for tax-
ation of the disposition of partnership interests base tax consequences
on what is being transferred. This regime would yield greater consis-
tency in results than the present provisions which often make tax con-
sequences turn on the crucial determination of whether the
partnership as an entity, rather than the partners as individuals,
makes the acquisition.
VI. CONCLUSION
The present Code provisions regulating the tax consequences of
the disposition of partnership interests provide great flexibility to the
parties to a withdrawal agreement. To a considerable extent, the par-
ties to a withdrawal agreement can control the allocation of the bur-
den of taxation. The myriad factors applied by the courts in deciding
where the burden has been placed make it difficult for parties to a
withdrawal agreement to choose from among the alternatives with as-
surance that their choices will prevail if challenged. Further, permit-
ting the parties to allocate the tax burden in the manner most
advantageous to all raises significant policy questions. Repeal of sec-
tion 736 and treatment of all dispositions of partnership interest as
sales would provide greater certainty and eliminate questionable tax
advantages in the partnership area.
180. Such an adjustment would apply to other partnership property as well. The ra-
tionale for making the basis adjustments under § 734(b) and § 743(b) elective was
that the tax advantages might be outweighed in some partnerships by bookkeep-
ing inconvenience and expense. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 70
(1954). If § 736 were unavailable, however, continuing partners who have
purchased the interest of a withdrawing partner should have some assured means
of receiving a basis adjustment when they have purchased the interest in unreal-
ized receivables of the withdrawing partner. Otherwise, the Treasury would re-
ceive income twice with respect to the same receivables: once when the
withdrawing partner transfers his interest under § 751 and a second time when
the partnership, upon collection of the receivable, receives more than the basis of
the receivable.
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